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Abstract  
Observational studies suggest that women’s income benefits children’s health and 
nutritional status, as well as education, more than men’s income, apparently because women are 
more likely to shift marginal resources to their children. These studies have influenced policies 
such as conditional cash transfers, which typically target women. However, previous studies 
have been unable to control for unobserved heterogeneity in child endowments and parental 
preferences. We report the results of a trial that allocated randomly one-time in-kind income in 
the form of edible rice (the main staple and cash crop in the study area) or rice seeds to the 
female or male household head (edible rice transfers, range: 30-395 kg/household; rice seeds: 5.9 
kg/household). The trial took place in a society of native Amazonian forager-farmers in Bolivia 
(2008-2009). Outcomes included four anthropometric indicators of short-run nutritional status of 
848 children from 40 villages. We found that the transfers produced no discernible impact on 
short-run (~5 months) nutritional status of children, or any differential effects between girls and 
boys by the gender of the household head who received the transfers. These null results probably 
relate to specific social norms of the Tsimane’, such as pooling of food resources, shared 
preferences, and relatively equal bargaining power between Tsimane’ women and men. The 
results highlight the probable importance of culture in household resource allocation and suggest 
that gender targeting in cash transfer programs might not increase investments in children in 
societies where women and men have more egalitarian household relationships. 
Keywords: Cash transfers | nutrition | gender | native Amazonians | randomized control trial 
JEL code: D13, H31, I20 
Summary of contents:  
Text: 4,924 words (including abstract); Tables: 5; Figures: 2.  
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1. Introduction 
There is a widely-held belief that income in the hands of women benefits children more than 
income in men’s hands, presumably from the socialization of women and from a biological pre-
disposition of women to care and to shift marginal resources more toward young children 
(Gettler, 2010; Trevathan, 2010). The belief finds support in observational studies (Behrman, 
1997; Handa, 1996; Pfeiffer et al., 2001; Qian, 2008; Rogers, 1996; Smith et al., 2003), but such 
studies do not permit firm conclusions about causality owing to endogeneity biases. Despite the 
uncertainty surrounding the estimates, cash transfer programs typically transfer income to 
women (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009). To our knowledge there is no published evidence with 
exogenous gendered-allocation of resources to support the belief that the well-being of young 
children improves more when women rather than men receive income (Yoong et al., 2012). 
Recent experimental studies provide indirect evidence that the conclusion might need 
reappraisal. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) estimated the effects of having women leaders on 
public investments in India. They found that communities with women leaders invested more in 
water (which might improve child health), but some invested less in education (which might 
erode child health). Braido et al. (2012) and Morris et al. (2004) used a natural experiment from 
a conditional cash transfer program in Brazil to examine the effect of the transfer on women’s 
bargaining power and child nutrition. Braido et al. (2012) found that women in households with 
a male partner who received transfers had similar expenditure patterns to their peers in control 
households, and Morris et al. (2004) found that children (<3 years old) of women who received 
transfers had lower rates of weight gain than their peers in control households. A recent 
evaluation of the PROGRESA (Oportunidades) program in Mexico found no difference in 
women’s use of conditional and earned income (Handa et al., 2009). A randomized experiment 
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of cash transfers labeled for education in rural communities in Morocco found large gains in 
child school participation, but it made essentially no difference to target transfers to female 
rather than to male household heads (Benhassine et al., 2013). Finally, Gitter and Barham (2008) 
found that conditional income transfers to women in Nicaragua increased child school 
enrollment, but the effects declined if a women’s bargaining power far exceeded that of her male 
partner. 
Taken together, these studies suggest that exogenous improvements in women’s income 
might not change consumption or improve child outcomes (or do so only under particular 
conditions), but most do not allow to assess the comparative effects of gender-targeted income 
transfers on child well-being because income was transferred only to women. To our knowledge, 
only two randomized control trials (RCTs) allow assessing the comparative effects of gender-
targeted transfers: a study in Morocco, which found no differential effects by recipients’ gender 
(Benhassine et al., 2013), and a recent study in Burkina Faso where gender effects are still under 
analysis (Akresh et al., 2013). 
Here we present the results of a RCT in which we randomized the female or the male 
household head to receive a one-time, unconditional in-kind transfer of income in the form of 
edible rice, to assess whether gender targeting of unconditional cash transfer increase 
investments in children. The trial took place in a foraging-farming society of native Amazonians 
in Bolivia, the Tsimane’ (Saidi et al., 2012). The Tsimane’ were an attractive society for the RCT 
because government conditional cash-transfer programs target populations with low monetary 
income, like the Tsimane’, but have overlooked specific characteristics of the populations such 
as the egalitarian social status of Tsimane’ men and women. Moreover, in recent years, the 
Bolivian government has begun to implement similar types of cash transfer programs (e.g., 
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Juancito Pinto, conditional on school attendance, Juana Azurduy, conditional on medical 
checkups) which have reached marginalized communities, including the Tsimane’ (Undurraga et 
al., 2013). While the Tsimane’ are still moderately engaged in the market economy and cash is of 
limited use in the communities, such a setting allowed us to control for confounders that are 
common in more industrialized societies.  Rice is their most important staple and cash crop 
(Vadez et al., 2004), a proxy for cash that is both fungible and consumable. The trial built on 
continual ethnographic studies since 1995 and on a panel study (2002-2010) among the Tsimane’ 
of a nearby area (Leonard and Godoy, 2008). We assessed the impact of the transfers on four 
anthropometric indicators of short-run nutritional status of children 2-9 years old about five 
months after the transfers. 
 
2. Background and study design 
2.1 The Tsimane’ 
Tsimane’ live mostly along the Maniqui and the Apere rivers, in a relatively remote 
corner of the Department of Beni (Huanca, 2008; Ringhofer, 2010). Missionaries and colonists 
have brought market goods and employment opportunities, but most Tsimane’ remain highly 
autarkic. A comparative study among 15 small-scale foraging and horticultural societies ranked 
the Tsimane’ next to the lowest in market exposure, with an average of about 7% of total 
household calories bought in the market (Henrich et al., 2010). About 40% of adults (≥ 16 years) 
during 2002-2007 had earned no monetary income during the two months before the interview. 
Tsimane’ earn monetary income through the sale of forest and farm goods, and through 
occasional wage labor in logging camps or cattle ranches; but they have low levels of monetary 
or non-monetary savings (Undurraga et al., 2013). In 2009, mean daily monetary income per 
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person reached US$0.90 (SD=2.1). 
Depending on the age bracket, 33-40% of Tsimane’ children are growth-stunted, similar 
to other native Amazonian societies (Foster et al., 2005; Godoy et al., 2010b; Orr et al., 2001). 
Household-level analyses of food-use patterns suggest that the Tsimane’ diet is sufficient to meet 
daily energy and protein requirements (Godoy et al., 2005), so the high levels of child stunting 
probably reflects high infectious disease loads and marginal dietary quality rather than limited 
food availability. Another explanation for the ubiquity of stunting may be related to modest 
height premiums among adults as perceived by parents (Godoy et al., 2006a; Godoy et al., 
2010a; Undurraga et al., 2012). Other anthropometric measures also suggest that Tsimane’ 
children are not experiencing observable protein-energy malnutrition. Specifically, weight-for-
height, body fatness, and indices of muscularity among Tsimane’ children all more closely 
approximate age-specific and sex-specific reference values than height-for-age (Foster et al., 
2005). The average girl or boy in our sample was 0.33 standard deviations (SD) above their age-
specific and sex-specific peers in the USA in weight-for-height measures, and only 1.2% of the 
sample was wasted.1 
Tsimane’ women are considerably empowered, although this does not seem obvious from 
standard economic and human capital indicators. For example, women lag behind men in 
monetary income, value of modern physical assets, and also in formal schooling, academic skills, 
and fluency speaking Spanish (Godoy et al., 2006b). The value of modern assets (e.g., metal 
tools) and monetary earnings of male household heads was 2.5 times larger than that of female 
household heads at baseline (2008). Female household heads had 1.3 fewer grades of schooling 
                                                 
1 Children with low (≤ -2 standard deviations) height-for-age Z-scores were considered stunted and children with 
low weight-for-height Z-scores were considered wasted; both measures indicate that children are nutritionally at 
risk. 
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attainment, a 30 percentage-point lower probability of speaking fluent Spanish, and lower formal 
math skills than male household heads of the same age. 
These disadvantages are partially offset by other indicators that relate to life away from 
the market. Observational data suggests that women maintain social status equal to men within 
community and home life. For example, female and male household heads did not differ in the 
monetary value of physical assets owned made from local materials (e.g., canoes) or in the value 
of their stock of domesticated animals (e.g., chickens). Additionally, female household heads in 
this and in a previous study (Godoy et al., 2006b) had better average nutritional indicators, such 
as higher age-standardized and sex-standardized Z-scores of muscle area, skinfolds, and weight-
for-age than their male counterparts.  
Although women and men own and keep physical assets separately, they pool resources 
in farming, with all in the family often literally eating from a common pot. The practice of 
preferential cross-cousin marriage plus matrilocal post-marital residence means that adult women 
live in villages with close kin to provide support, which enhances perceived empowerment. 
Several aspects of Tsimane’ life suggest gender equality in running the household. For example, 
both women and men pool labor resources for agricultural production, and both have equal say in 
food production. Men hunt, but women collect plants and produce chicha, a locally-fermented 
beverage that contributes to social gatherings and, thus, to a household’s status in the village.  
 
2.2 Experimental Design 
Recent estimates suggest that Tsimane’ number ~14,200 and live in ~95 villages of at 
least eight households each (Gran Consejo Tsimane', 2013). To select the 40 villages for the trial, 
we excluded villages participating in other studies, too costly to reach, too small or unsafe, or 
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that contained other ethnic groups. This left 65 villages of which we selected 40 based on 
accessibility (Figure 1). Only 4% of households in the sample were single-headed.  
The random assignment of income transfers to female versus male household heads was 
part of a trial to estimate the effects of unconditional income transfers on adult and child health 
in 40 Tsimane’ villages. The trial had two treatment groups that received edible rice – one 
treatment included transfers to all households and in the other transfers was targeted at the 
poorest 20% – and a control group that received improved rice seeds (Figure 2). The baseline 
survey happened during February-May, 2008, the transfers happened during October 2008-
January 2009, and the follow-up survey happened during February-May 2009.  
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Figure 1. Tsimane’ villages in the panel study and randomized control trial (Beni, Bolivia) 
 
Notes: The colors of the territory denote elevation; mamsl denotes meters above mean sea level. The square symbols 
and letters in each town are approximately proportional in size to town population. [Color online, grayscale on print] 
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Figure 2. Summary of Experimental Design 
 
Notes: HH denotes household. All households in T1 received rice transfers; only the households in 
the bottom 20% of the village income distribution in T2 received income transfers, and the top 80% 
received rice seeds; all households in the control group received rice seeds. The recipient of the 
transfers was chosen at random between the male and female household head in all groups. The 
households by treatment arm and the total households shown in the figure include only households 
that had children between 2 and 9 years old, and that were present during the baseline and follow-up 
of the trial. The complete trial included 494 HH; 153 HH in T1, 176 HH in T2, and 165 in the 
control group.  
 
 
Treatment 1 (T1): Each of the 13 villages received a total of 782 kg of edible rice, which 
was divided equally among all households of the village. Hence, the amount of rice per person 
varied within and across villages for two reasons. First, the amount of edible rice received by 
each household was inversely related to the number of households in a village (mean: 58 kg; 
median: 52 kg; SD: 23 kg; range 30-131 kg). Second, the amount of rice per person varied 
further by household size. 
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Treatment 2 (T2): Thirteen villages received the same aggregate amount of edible rice as 
in T1 (782 kg), but the transfers were targeted only to households in the bottom 20% of the 
village income distribution (mean: 177 kg; median: 157 kg; SD: 81 kg; range 98-395 kg). Not 
surprisingly –considering the limited sample of villages for the trial– the quantity of edible rice 
transferred to households in T2 was only about three times larger than in T1 (as opposed to five 
times larger) since the village population distribution of the two treatments was not identical.  
We used the area of old and fallow forest cleared by households (per person) at baseline 
to identify the poorest 20% of households in a village (Behrman et al. 2011). Each year 
households clear forests to plant annual and perennial crops. Forest area cleared is a reasonable 
proxy for annual income because all farm output from cleared plots is consumed, sold, or 
bartered, thus capturing household total annual consumptions and monetary income from farm 
products. But area of forest cleared does not include occasional income from wage labor or from 
the sale of forest products. 
Controls: Control households included all households in the 14 villages that were not part 
of T1 or T2. Households in the top 80% of the village income distribution of villages receiving T2 
received the same transfer as controls, but were analyzed as a separate group. All households in 
the control group received 5.9 kg of rice seeds. 
Random gender-targeting in the delivery of transfers: All transfers were randomly 
assigned to the female or to male household head; however, not all them were present during the 
transfers to directly receive the rice from us (present: treatment=62%, control=52%; χ2= 4.5, 
p=0.03). If the female or male household head selected was missing, we gave the transfer to a 
third party (e.g., teacher) and asked the person to give the transfer to the absent household head 
when the head returned to the village. In the robustness analysis we exclude third-party 
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recipients.  
 
2.3 Significance of the transfers 
We used rice rather than money because of the limited use of money in remote villages 
and because of the importance of rice as a staple and as a cash crop (Vadez et al., 2004). Total 
monetary expenditures on all foods did not change due to the rice transfers, suggesting that the 
transfers did not displace other foods.  
The transfers of rice amounted to ~US$11/person for people in villages receiving T1 and 
to ~US$ 33/person for people in the bottom 20% of the income distribution in villages receiving 
T2. The transfers amounted to income earned over 12.4 days (T1) or 36.5 days (T2) for an average 
Tsimane’. Annual panel data (2002-2007) suggests that mean weekly rice consumption per 
person was ~1 kg, so expressed in terms of rice consumption and assuming a household had six 
people –the average for the sample– a person in either T1 or T2 would have had enough rice for 
10 weeks (T1) or 30 weeks (T2).  
The monetary value of the rice seeds given to control households was US$ 1.7/person, 
but the perceived value of the improved rice seeds at delivery time may have been lower, as there 
is no market for improved rice seeds in the study area and Tsimane’ reported they did not like the 
harvested rice from improved seeds in focus groups and interviews following the study 
(February 2011).  
From a nutritional perspective, the rice transfers represented a substantial infusion of 
energy and protein (Table 1). Assuming 10% wastage over five months (150 days), the 58 kg 
transfers would have added 1,249 kcal/day and 25 g/day of protein to average household 
availabilities. For the 177 kg transfers, the daily increases would have been 3,813 kcal of energy 
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and 75 grams of protein. Considering the nutritional needs of an average Tsimane’ child (Table 
1) even a small allocation of the household rice allotment would have important nutritional 
implications for Tsimane’ children. Indeed, for the 58 kg rice transfers, a 10% allocation to a 
five-year old child would meet ~10% of the child’s daily energy requirements and 16-17% of 
daily protein needs. For the large rice transfers (177 kg) of T2, a 10% allocation accounts for 
~30% of the energy requirements and half of the protein needs of a 5.5 year old Tsimane’ child. 
The WHO recommends that an increase of ~3-4% in dietary energy consumption is necessary for 
‘catch up’ growth in body weight for a child of this age (FAO/WHO/UNU, 2004). 
 
Table 1. Nutritional significance of rice transfers for household energy and protein availability 
 58 kg rice Transfer  177 kg rice Transfer 
 Energy (kcal) Protein (g)  Energy (kcal) Protein (g) 
Total infusion 208,220 4,118  635,430 12,567 
Daily increase 
(household/day)a 
1,249 25  3,813 75 
Boy’s daily needsb 1,281 15  1,281 15 
Percent of needs (10% rice 
allocation) 
9.8% 17.0%  29.8% 50.0% 
Girl’s daily needsb 1,165 14  1,165 14 
Percent of needs (10% rice 
allocation) 
10.7% 17.9%  32.7% 53.6% 
Notes: a Daily increase calculated over 150 days of consumption, assuming 10% wastage. b Estimates based on 
WHO energy and protein requirements (FAO/WHO/UNU, 2004; WHO, 2007) for an average Tsimane’ boy and 
girl of 5.5 years of age (boy: 17.2 kg; girl: 16.3 kg) 
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2.4 Methods: Anthropometric data and analysis  
We collected children’s anthropometric data following Lohman et al.’s (1988) protocol. 
Linear growth (stature/length) was measured to the nearest millimeter using a portable 
stadiometer. Body weight was measured to the nearest 0.2 kg using a standing scale. We 
measured mid upper-arm circumference (MUAC) to the nearest millimeter using a plastic tape 
measure and triceps skinfold thickness (TST) to the nearest 0.5 mm using Lange skinfold 
calipers. From raw anthropometric measures, we calculated two additional indices: weight-for-
height Z-score (WHZ) and arm muscle area (AMA). WHZ values were calculated relative to the 
WHO (1995, 2006) reference values. We followed the procedure of Frisancho (1990) to 
calculate AMA (cm2) from MUAC and TST measures. 
Weight-for-Height Z-score (WHZ) was used to assess wasting and mortality risk. Because 
the growth velocities of children in both weight and stature depend on age, changes in weight-
for-height were assessed as Z-scores. Z-scores capture the difference between the measured 
value of the Tsimane’ child’s weight-for-height and the median value of the reference population 
for weight-for-height at the same sex and age, divided by the standard deviation of the reference 
population for that nutritional indicator. Low values of WHZ reflect acute energy deficiency; 
children with WHZ scores ≤–2.0 are classified as wasted. 
Mid-Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) measures the diameter of the upper arm and 
assesses both fat storage (source of energy) and muscle mass (source of protein or amino acids). 
Fat and muscle mass are energy reserves for vital functions during infection. MUAC can predict 
mortality among young children independent of WHZ and other weight-based or height-based 
measures (Berkley et al., 2005; Briend et al., 1989; Van den Broeck et al., 1998). MUAC is a 
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stronger predictor of early childhood mortality than either height-based or weight-based 
anthropometric indices (deOnis et al., 1997; Trowbridge and Sommer, 1981).  
Arm-Muscle Area (AMA) captures muscular development and protein reserve (Saito et 
al., 2010). Consequently, as with low WHZ, low AMA is indicative of protein-energy 
malnutrition.  
Triceps Skinfold Thickness (TST) measures the thickness of subcutaneous adipose tissue 
and captures total body fat and energy reserves (Jebb et al., 1993; Pecoraro et al., 2003). High fat 
content is associated with high calorie intake or low energy expenditure (Frisancho, 1990). Fat 
assessment has an added advantage because fat remains stable among children 1-7 years of age 
(Gurney, 1969). The use of muscle and fat measures was of primary interest because these 
dimensions are affected by nutritional disorders and can change in the short run (Briend et al., 
1989; Holliday, 1978).  
We limited the analysis to children from 2 to 9 years old. We set the upper age bracket to 
ensure puberty did not affect estimates of growth rates. Previous studies suggest that Tsimane’ 
children may enter pre-pubertal growth spurt as early as 10-12 years of age (Byron, 2003; Godoy 
et al., 2010b). Tsimane’ mothers breastfeed their children for about two years, so including 
children less than two years old would have increased age-related heterogeneity regarding the 
possible consumption of rice by children. The final sample included 40 villages, 191 households, 
and 848 children (girls=407, boys=441) (Table 2). The total baseline sample contained 959 
children (girls=473; boys=486), but by the time of the follow-up survey 24 girls and 21 boys had 
left (4.7% loss of the baseline sample).  
We analyzed the pooled sample, and also divided the sample into four groups to take into 
account that we transferred two resources (rice and seeds) and that treatment effects in T2 might 
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vary by the household’s position in the village income distribution (Saidi et al., 2012). The 
groups included: (1) all households in T1, (2) all households in the 14 control villages, (3) 
households in the bottom 20% of the village income distribution in T2, and (4) households in the 
top 80% of the village income distribution in T2. 
We estimated the effect of the income transfers to female or male household heads on 
child nutritional status using a double-difference estimator, based on the following model for 
each anthropometric outcome: 
 
Yaihvt = α + βMaleThvt + γAfterihvt + δMaleT*Afterihvt + υXihvt + εaihvt   (1) 
 
Where the subscripts stand for anthropometric indicators (a), individual or child (i), 
household (h), village (v), and year (t). MaleT is an indicator for treatment (1=recipient was a 
man; 0=recipient was a woman); After is an indicator for time (0=2008 or baseline; 1=2009 or 
follow up, after), MaleT*After is an interaction term, X is a vector of control variables (child age 
and sex, and outcome at baseline), and ε is a disturbance term. The coefficient δ is the difference-
in-difference (DID) estimate for the effect of gender-targeting the transfer. We estimated 
expression [1] for each of the four groups separately, and in some regressions we pooled the four 
groups and add indicator variables for T1 and T2, to increase statistical power. We adjusted the 
standard errors for clustering at the village level.
17 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics at baseline (children 2-9 years old)  
 T1  T2.  Control   Sub-totals  Total 
 
(Rice)  
Bot 20% 
(Rice) 
Top 80% 
(Seeds) 
 (Seeds)  
T1+Bot 20% 
T2 (Rice)
Control+ 
Top 80% 
T2 (Seeds) 
 (Both) 
Children            
Girls (N) 132  42 94  139  174 233  407 
Boys (N) 124  45 108  164  169 272  441 
Attrition (N) 9   4 15  17  13 32  45 
Household winner
a
           
Women (N) 23  14 23  28  37 51  88 
Men (N) 38  7 23  35  45 58  103 
Villages 13  13  14     40 
Child attributes: mean (standard deviation)      
Age 5.5 (2.2)  5.3 (2.2) 5.3 (2.3)  5.5 (2.2)  5.4 (2.2) 5.4 (2.3)  5.4 (2.2) 
WHZ 0.4 (0.8)  0.3 (0.7) 0.2 (0.9)  0.3 (0.7)  0.4 (0.8) 0.3 (0.8)  0.3 (0.8) 
AMA 16.1 (3.6)  15.2 (4.2) 15.9 (4.2)  16.4 (4.1)  15.9 (3.8) 16.2 (4.2)  16.1 (4.0) 
MUAC 16.4 (1.7)  16.0 (1.8) 16.3 (1.8)  16.4 (1.7)  16.3 (1.7) 16.4 (1.8)  16.3 (1.7) 
TST 7.3 (2.3)  7.3 (2.8) 7.2 (2.5)  6.9 (1.9)  7.3 (2.4) 7.0 (2.2)  7.2 (2.3) 
Notes: aHousehold winner refers to household head who was selected to receive the transfer, even if absent at the 
time of the transfer. T1, T2 denote treatment 1 and treatment 2.  
 
 
3. Results 
Tables 3 and 4 contain the parameter estimates for equation [1]. The most striking finding 
in Tables 3 and 4 is the absence of almost any statistically significant result for the difference-in-
difference coefficient, whether we did the analysis with the four separate groups or pooled all 
groups while controlling for T1 and T2. 
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Table 3. Difference-in-difference estimate of the effects of -targeted income transfers on child 
anthropometric indicators of nutritional status, controlling for baseline outcomes (T1 and T2 villages) 
 T1 T2: Bottom 20% T2: Top 80% 
Explanatory 
variables: 
WHZ MUACb AMAb TSFb  WHZ MUACb AMAb TSFb  WHZ MUACb AMAb TSFb 
DIDa -0.023 0.003 0.029 -0.064  -0.044 0.040 0.064 0.070  0.123 -0.016 -0.038 0.012 
 (0.124) (0.011) (0.030) (0.058)  (0.120) (0.025) (0.058) (0.039)  (0.151) (0.022) (0.054) (0.048) 
After -0.073 0.013 0.016 0.027  -0.021 -0.003 0.017 -0.054  -0.088 0.002 0.022 -0.044 
 (0.094) (0.010) (0.023) (0.038)  (0.120) (0.017) (0.056) (0.076)  (0.133) (0.011) (0.029) (0.050) 
MaleT -0.017 -0.000 -0.005 0.010  -0.028 -0.014 -0.029 -0.020  -0.105 -0.007 -0.012 -0.014 
 (0.033) (0.003) (0.012) (0.009)  (0.054) (0.008) (0.017) (0.022)  (0.056) (0.006) (0.012) (0.023) 
Boy (child sex) -0.056 -0.007 -0.011 -0.021  0.002 -0.022* -0.043 -0.017  0.017 -0.012 -0.018 -0.042 
 (0.036) (0.004) (0.012) (0.015)  (0.095) (0.010) (0.024) (0.015)  (0.062) (0.008) (0.014) (0.025) 
Age (child age) 0.021 0.007* 0.023** -0.004  0.024 0.012** 0.034** -0.012  -0.007 0.009* 0.029** -0.008 
 (0.014) (0.002) (0.007) (0.004)  (0.014) (0.002) (0.005) (0.008)  (0.018) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
Base outcome c 0.775** 0.765** 0.689** 0.745**  0.654** 0.664** 0.626** 0.725**  0.662** 0.678** 0.608** 0.654** 
 (0.054) (0.101) (0.102) (0.027)  (0.114) (0.043) (0.035) (0.030)  (0.054) (0.073) (0.056) (0.029) 
Constant 0.024 0.623* 0.737* 0.522**  -0.014 0.884** 0.858** 0.610**  0.156 0.857** 0.932** 0.736** 
 (0.070) (0.271) (0.247) (0.063)  (0.105) (0.118) (0.090) (0.063)  (0.125) (0.192) (0.136) (0.079) 
Observations 477 477 475 475  163 162 162 162  399 397 393 393 
R2 0.642 0.772 0.735 0.602  0.458 0.737 0.712 0.633  0.471 0.510 0.538 0.571 
Notes: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, robust standard errors (in parentheses) were adjusted for clustering at the village level. DID 
denotes difference in difference, T1 and T2 denotes treatment 1 and treatment 2. 
a DID=MaleT *After. b Outcomes in 
natural logarithms. c Base outcome denotes the indicator of child nutritional status at baseline.
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Table 4. Difference-in-difference estimate of the effects of gender-targeted income transfers on 
child anthropometric indicators of nutritional status, controlling for baseline outcomes (control 
and pooled villages) 
  Control  Pooled 
Explanatory 
variables: 
WHZ MUACb AMAb TSFb  WHZ MUACb AMAb TSFb 
DIDa 0.087 -0.001 -0.023 0.058  0.046 0.001 -0.003 0.012 
 (0.132) (0.010) (0.032) (0.034)  (0.069) (0.007) (0.021) (0.026) 
After -0.150 0.003 0.009 -0.009  -0.096 0.005 0.016 -0.014 
 (0.080) (0.012) (0.028) (0.027)  (0.049) (0.006) (0.017) (0.023) 
MaleT -0.017 -0.004 -0.007 -0.009  -0.037 -0.004 -0.010 -0.004 
 (0.028) (0.003) (0.009) (0.010)  (0.021) (0.002) (0.006) (0.007) 
Boy (child sex) 0.013 0.001 0.010 -0.030*  0.000 -0.007* -0.008 -0.029** 
 (0.049) (0.002) (0.009) (0.014)  (0.030) (0.003) (0.007) (0.009) 
Age (child age) 0.028 0.009** 0.029** -0.011**  0.016 0.009** 0.028** -0.008** 
 (0.019) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003)  (0.009) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
Base outcome c 0.735** 0.725** 0.671** 0.670**  0.714** 0.722** 0.654** 0.692** 
 (0.058) (0.041) (0.046) (0.033)  (0.028) (0.042) (0.039) (0.017) 
T1
d      0.050 0.005 0.010 0.002 
      (0.042) (0.005) (0.012) (0.018) 
T2
d      0.025 -0.003 -0.003 -0.017 
      (0.044) (0.006) (0.014) (0.014) 
Constant -0.072 0.718** 0.748** 0.706**  0.002 0.735** 0.807** 0.660** 
 (0.087) (0.106) (0.108) (0.068)  (0.059) (0.111) (0.093) (0.042) 
Observations 553 555 552 552  1592 1591 1582 1582 
R2 0.565 0.743 0.732 0.515  0.547 0.670 0.668 0.568 
Notes: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, robust standard errors (in parentheses) were adjusted for clustering at the village level. 
DID denotes difference in difference, T1 and T2 denotes treatment 1 and treatment 2 
a DID=MaleT*After. b Outcomes 
in natural logarithms. c Base outcome denotes the indicator of child nutritional status at baseline. d Excluded category 
are control villages. 
 
Next, we did several extensions and robustness checks. First, we re-estimated the 
regressions of Tables 3 and 4 by raising the upper age limit from nine years of age to include 
children ≤16 years old, and found no significant results (regressions not shown). Second, we 
assessed whether the treatment might have had a stronger effect on children 2-5 years of age 
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since mothers might be particularly important for the nutrition of pre-school age children (Navia 
et al., 2003; Ovaskainen et al., 2009). We created an indicator variable for this age bracket 
(child), and interacted it with all variables from equation [1]. To assess whether the triple 
difference-in-difference estimate (MaleT*After*child) was significant, we ran the regression for 
the pooled sample with all these interaction variables and found no significant effect for any 
group (regressions not shown). Third, we assessed whether mothers and fathers skewed 
investments differently between daughters and sons (Godoy et al., 2006c; Thomas, 1994). Using 
the pooled sample, we interacted the child sex variable (boy) with all the variables of Tables 3 
and 4, and assessed whether the triple interaction, MaleT*After*boy, was significant (Table 5). 
We found no significant results. Fourth, we limited the analysis to households that directly 
received the transfer from us rather than from third parties (Table 6) using the pooled sample, 
and again found no significant results.  
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Table 5. Triple difference-in-difference estimate of the differential effects of gender-targeted 
income transfers on anthropometric indicators of nutritional status of boys versus girls, 
controlling for baseline conditions (pooled sample) 
Explanatory variables: WHZ MUAC
b
 AMA
b
 TSF
b
 
DID a 0.079 0.003 0.004 0.033 
 (.077) (0.008) (0.025) (0.033) 
After -0.107 0.010 0.032 -0.029 
 (.056) (0.006) (0.018) (0.027) 
MaleT -0.065* -0.006 * -0.016 * -0.004 
 (.025) (0.002) (0.007) (0.009) 
Age (child age) 0.011 0.010 ** 0.030 * -0.003 
 (.009) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Boy (child sex) -0.049 0.026 0.001 0.014 
 (.091) (0.224) (0.160) (0.078) 
Base outcome 0.730 ** 0.719** 0.644** 0.684** 
 (0.047) (0.037) (0.028) (0.024) 
T1 0.078 0.009 0.020 0.001 
 (0.047) (0.005) (0.013) (0.020) 
T2 0.017 0.005 0.016 -0.014 
 (0.051) (0.005) (0.012) (0.016) 
DID*boy 
e
 -0.066 -0.005 -0.015 -0.041 
 (0.133) (0.0148) (0.033) (0.044) 
After*boy 0.022 -0.010 -0.030 0.027 
 (0.096) (0.009) (0.021) (0.029) 
MaleT*boy 0.055 0.003 0.012 0.002 
 (0.032) (0.004) (0.010) (0.012) 
Age *boy 0.009 -0.002 -0.003 -0.010 * 
 (.015) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) 
Base outcome*boy -0.026 -0.004 0.014 0.005 
 (0.052) (0.085) (0.067) (0.036) 
T1*boy -0.054 -0.008 -0.020 0.002 
 (0.067) (0.005) (0.015) (0.022) 
T2*boy 0.011 -0.015* -0.034* -0.006 
 (.077) (0.006) (0.015) (0.022) 
Constant 0.029 0.728** 0.807** 0.645** 
 (0.057) (0.097) (0.066) (0.050) 
Observations 1592 1591 1582 1582 
R2 0.542 0.671 0.669 0.570 
Notes: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, robust standard errors (in parentheses) were adjusted for clustering at the village 
level. DID denotes difference in difference, T1 and T2 denotes treatment 1 and 2. 
a  DID=MaleT*After. b  In natural 
logarithms. c  Excluded category is control villages. d  Base outcome denotes the indicator of child nutritional status 
at baseline. e DID*boy=MaleT*After*boy. 
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Table 6. Difference-in-difference estimate of the effects of gender-targeted income transfers on 
child anthropometric indicators of nutritional status, restricted to households that directly 
received the transfer from researchers (pooled sample) 
Explanatory variables: WHZ MUAC
b
 AMA
b
 TSF
b
 
DID a 0.059 -0.006 -0.019 0.014 
 (0.075) (0.010) (0.027) (0.037) 
After -0.083 0.007 0.022 -0.019 
 (0.058) (0.009) (0.024) (0.035) 
MaleT -0.059** -0.007 -0.013 -0.011 
 (0.021) (0.003) (0.010) (0.010) 
Boy (child sex) 0.025 -0.011* -0.015 -0.040** 
 (0.032) (0.005) (0.010) (0.011) 
Age (child age) 0.022* 0.009** 0.028** -0.009** 
 (0.009) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) 
Base outcome 0.751** 0.689** 0.634** 0.698** 
 (0.031) (0.059) (0.055) (0.022) 
T1 0.085* 0.006 0.003 0.023 
 (0.041) (0.006) (0.014) (0.022) 
T2 0.048 -0.006 -0.011 -0.013 
 (0.053) (0.008) (0.017) (0.016) 
Constant -0.074 0.825** 0.863** 0.652** 
 (0.057) (0.155) (0.128) (0.053) 
Observations 940 943 936 936 
R-squared 0.62 0.64 0.64 0.57 
Notes: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, robust standard errors (in parentheses) were adjusted for clustering at the village 
level. DID denotes difference in difference, T1 and T2 denotes treatment 1 and 2. 
a DID=MaleT*After. b In 
natural logarithms. c Excluded category is control villages. d Base outcome denotes the indicator of child 
nutritional status at baseline.  
 
To test whether the transfers between female and male household heads were well 
randomized, we ran separate regressions using treatment (MaleT) as the outcome variable and 
the child’s age, sex, and anthropometric indicator as independent variables, for each of the four 
groups and anthropometric indicators, considering only the baseline year. In all but one of the 
regressions all the individual coefficients and the overall F statistic were not significant at the 
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95% confidence interval, suggesting that the assignment of the treatments between female and 
male household heads was well randomized (regressions not shown). 
Although the rate of child attrition was low (4.7%), we examined whether attrition could 
have driven the results. We regressed the raw anthropometric measures (outcome variables) 
against MaleT, child’s sex and age, T1 and T2, a discrete indicator variable for attrition, and a 
vector of interaction variables of the attrition indicator variable with all the above explanatory 
variables. F tests for the joint significance of the interaction of the attrition variable with all the 
explanatory variables were never significant (regressions not shown). 
 
4. Discussion 
We found no effects of one-time, unconditional in-kind income transfers on child 
nutritional status, and no differential effect by whether the female or the male household head 
received the transfers. Here we discuss possible explanations for these results and implications of 
the study. 
The lack of effects may be partially explained by the low income elasticities of nutrient 
consumption (Behrman and Deolalikar, 1989; Bouis, 1994; Bouis and Haddad, 1992) and by the 
relatively good anthropometric indicators of nutritional status of Tsimane’ children at baseline 
except for stunting; quite possibly Tsimane’ do not perceive their children to be short because 
their reference is their community, not international standards (Godoy et al., 2010a). Further, the 
transfers may have been inadequate to improve nutritional quality. Research on the dietary 
correlates of early childhood growth in the developing world, including South American 
populations, has shown that measures of dietary quality (i.e., nutrient density), such as percent of 
dietary energy/protein from animal foods, and amount of animal protein consumed are stronger 
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predictors of physical growth patterns than overall intakes of energy or protein (Allen, 1993, 
2003; Leonard et al., 1995, 2000). Consequently, even though the transfers likely increased total 
energy availability at the household level, that they may not have directly increased dietary 
quality may have limited their potential impact on children. These three qualifications might 
explain why we found no significant direct effects, but would not explain the absence of 
differential effects on child nutritional status by the parent receiving the transfer. 
Intra-household resource allocation depends on the specific social norms of a community. 
We focus on three possible explanations which may affect the outcomes and results of the study: 
resource pooling within the household and common household decision-making, shared 
preferences, and equal bargaining power between female and male household heads.  
Unlike physical assets, over which Tsimane’ have well-defined private property rights, 
with food resources Tsimane’ have an open-access policy of allowing any person in the 
household to consume the food. Tsimane’ horticulture requires cooperation. Men cut the large 
trees for farming, but thereafter women and men work jointly clearing the underbrush, burning, 
planting, weeding, and harvesting. Both have equal rights to the farm plots and equal say on the 
end uses of the harvest, including bartering or selling crops. There is no gendered division in 
food products, and no restrictions on access to food (except for food taboos during specific 
periods in the life cycle). Wildlife and harvested crops are pooled and food crops are stored in 
the house, available for any person in the household. Furthermore, although women or older un-
married daughters take primary responsibilities for cooking, the food is placed in an open pot for 
all people to eat directly, or dished out. In sum, we might not observe differences in child 
nutritional status in relation to the parent who received the transfer because the food would have 
been accessible for all people in the household to eat.  
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The impact of the transfers might have been attenuated by leakages through gifts or 
reciprocal exchanges to other households. Households gave away 11% of the edible rice 
received, while control households gave away 3% of the transfer. Households maintain their own 
food stocks, but will cook and eat from communal pots, and often share a kitchen with the 
extended family. Tsimane’ are less likely to share uncooked food, except at the end of the rainy 
season (January-April) when stocks of rice dwindle and the new crop has yet to be harvested. At 
this point those with extra rice might share it with their neighbors or extended family, but others 
might rely primarily on plantains or might buy food in towns. 
Because the Tsimane’ are a tightly-knit, small-scale endogamic society, it is not 
surprising that Tsimane’ parents would share preferences about food consumption and child 
rearing. Indirect evidence suggests that Tsimane’ share many traits, such as ethno-botanical 
knowledge (Reyes-Garcia et al., 2003), and practice positive assortative mating for age, 
schooling, body size and type, ethno-botanical knowledge, and psychological traits (Godoy et al., 
2008). We found almost no significant gender differences in the amount of rice allocated to 
barter, sale, gifts to others, or that they had in storage at the time of the follow-up survey. 
However, women reported allocating 25% more rice to direct consumption than men (t=4.15; 
p=0.001), most likely because women cook and keep closer tabs on rice stocks. 
Last, we might have observed no differential impact on child nutritional status if women 
and men were equally empowered (Basu, 2006; Gitter and Barham, 2008; Smith et al., 2003). In 
an earlier study (Godoy et al., 2006b) we found that women saw themselves as the major 
decision makers and tie breakers when spouses could not reach an agreement in various 
economic domains of the household economy (e.g., buying or selling goods, child schooling), 
except with decisions about wage labor and the purchase of commercial alcoholic beverages. 
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Equality in the ownership of traditional wealth and stocks of domesticated animals, and a wide 
support of kin may explain female empowerment. A person’s fallback position when cooperation 
fails is thought to play a major role in empowerment (Agarwal, 1997; Behrman and Rosenzweig, 
2006; McElroy, 1990).  
Our results have at least one policy implication. If other societies resemble the Tsimane’ 
in resource pooling, sharing of preferences, and female empowerment, then targeting transfers to 
women might not affect investments in children. Gender targeting not only has equity 
implications but may also raise implementation costs or produce gender-based conflicts (Hidrobo 
and Fernald, 2012). The absence of large effects on child nutritional status raises the questions of 
whether larger transfers, more frequent transfers, or conditionality would be required to have 
measureable impact on child nutritional status. A systematic review comparing the effect of 
conditionality of income transfers on educational outcomes suggests that while conditional and 
unconditional cash transfers improved schooling outcomes, these improvements were always 
larger with conditionality (Baird et al., 2013).  
The results shown also raise concerns about the potential limits of standard economic and 
modern human capital indicators to infer intra-household bargaining power and female 
empowerment. Researchers typically estimate the gap or ratio in earnings, asset wealth, or 
human capital between female and male household heads to make inferences about the degree of 
female empowerment (Gitter and Barham, 2008). If applied to the Tsimane’, the approach would 
lead one to the conclusion that adult women lacked bargaining power compared with men. What 
we find, instead, is that female empowerment seems to reflect not only access to some material 
resources, but also harder-to-measure social norms.  
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5. Conclusion 
To conclude, in this highly autarkic and relatively egalitarian society, large one-time 
gender-targeted unconditional income transfers produced no discernible impact on short-run 
nutritional status of children. The trial did not allow us to identify the mechanisms for the null 
finding, but ethnographic research and panel data suggest that specific social norms of the 
community, such as pooling of resources, shared preferences, and female empowerment might 
be plausible explanations. The null findings are in accord with the predictions of a unitary 
household model with common preferences and constraints (Behrman, 1997). More importantly, 
our results highlight the probable importance of culture in determining household decision-
making and resource allocation, and raises questions about the belief that income in the hands of 
women benefits young children more than income in the hands of men.  
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